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| First English edition of Science of Logic (1929) |
Introduction (Stephen Cowley)
These next paragraphs concern the notions of the beginning and development as components of logical method. Hegel has already discussed the beginning in the opening essay With What Must Science Begin? Here however, he speaks with the fullness of retrospection rather than by way of anticipation and there are some helpful synoptic passages.
The circular structure of philosophy means that its beginning is only an occasional cause of the whole. Hence it is of little consequence where one begins, as one question naturally leads on to another until the whole field of inquiry emerges. This is because the fundamental parts of philosophy – metaphysics, epistemology, logic and moral philosophy, i.e. the first sciences of being, knowing, thinking and action – are inter-related. Genuine thought on any of these generates questions about the others – as for example, when we act, we do so in light of our knowledge, which is a product of thought, which concerns what is. In this way, Plato’s early dialogues lead us, through chance encounters with the public figures of Athens and the concepts they bring to bear on the life of the city, into a complete philosophy.
Hegel concludes here that the beginning (pure being) of his sequence of logical concepts is mediated – moreover, I would add, it is false, for it conflates the Being of God as first cause and ground of created Being, with the Being of creation, which is derivative and contingent. He wrongly assumes that there is a common universal to be abstracted from God as necessary ground and the being of creation. Hegel rejects Kant’s criticism of the Ontological argument on similar grounds. Yet he also countenances the assertion that “The Absolute is pure being” at the start of the Logic. This endorses the univocity of being found in Scotus and Hume's Dialogues. This gives philosophy a priority over religion that it would not otherwise deserve. One might as well begin with God, like Spinoza in his Ethics.
Hegel also says that the Philosophy of Nature (the beginning of the concrete sciences) is not an absolute beginning, but grounded in a prior reason. Here we may agree without wandering into the realm of unorthodoxy. The form of the personal, which incorporates its own negation within itself, can be interpreted to give a more orthodox doctrine of creation than that of Spinoza’s Ethics.
When he turns to the idea of development, the conflict between the purported method of pure ideational deduction and the partly empirical content is clarified in the essential role that the later Encyclopaedia Logic gives to experience. Hegel’s critic Rudolf Haym compares this empirical element of the Logic to a snowball that gathers in one’s mind as one reads it; for Haym, the real method is a repeated lowering of pure concepts into lived experience, only to find them evaporating again into the aether of abstraction (Hegel in seiner Zeit). Dialectical relationships exist, in other words, but their relationship to experience needs to be rethought.
The Absolute Idea (Part Two)Summary and Discussion (continued)
The Beginning
[5] Firstly then, Hegel concludes, there is the Beginning, then its Development. The idea of Beginning was addressed at the outset of the Logic and in Subjective Cognition. As Beginning, the content is “an immediate which has the meaning and form of abstract universality.” (470) Although immediate, it does not belong to the senses or imagination (Vorstellung), but to thought. Hence it may be called a “supersensuous or internal intuition.” (470) In sensuous intuition, the immediate is manifold and singular. In cognition, it is simple and universal. This is an elevation of these other faculties to thought, but it takes us beyond a beginning. Hegel says:
“According to the current [Kantian] opposition (geläufige Gegensatz) of thought or concept and Being, it appears as an important truth that the former for itself has still no Being and that the latter should have its own ground, independent of thought.” (G333, 470)
Being is a poor determination. It requires no further derivation though. It can be simply pointed out. Hegel says: “This pointing (Montriren) and derivation relate to a mediation which is more than a mere Beginning.” (470) There is an inner meaning to the “demand for the demonstration of Being” (470), but this does not pertain to the beginning, but to the development of cognition. To focus in on perception, on pointing, is to lose universality in gaining a determinate content.
[6] The Beginning then is simple and universal and it is just this determination that leaves it wanting. In universality, it has not yet become determinate. If we were to develop this beginning “only for the sake of the method (um der Methode), 471), the method would be something formal, posited in external reflection. Here though, the method is immanent. Hence the beginning must be “inherently defective” (471) and endowed with a drive of self-development. Hegel says: “In the absolute method though, the universal does not count as merely abstract, but as the objectively universal.” (G334, 471) Even an abstract universal is “not only the simple” (471), for it already includes a negation. Hegel writes: “For this reason, there is, neither in reality not in thought, nothing so simple and abstract as is commonly imagined.” (G334, 471) Such false simplicity is based on ignorance of what is in fact given.
The Beginning was also said to be immediate, which is what we have here described as its being in itself, but not for itself. Hence we might say that every beginning is made from the absolute, and every progress is an exhibition of it insofar as the in-itself is the notion. Yet as merely in-itself, it is also not the absolute (nor notion, nor Idea). Hegel says in conclusion:
“The progress is therefore not a kind of overflow (Überfluss, i.e. superfluity), which it would be if in truth that which begins were already the absolute; rather the progress consists in this, that the universal determines itself and is the universal for-itself, that is, is equally also individual and subject. It is the absolute only in its completion.” (471-72)
[7] Hegel notes that the beginning, as immediate, may also be determined [either] as free, or an external Daseyn. The germ (Keim) of life and the subjective goal are examples of such [free] beginnings. The non-mental, non-living are but real possibility, belonging to the realm of necessity and rising in contrast no higher than the concept of cause. Such objects as the sun are not subjects realising themselves. Their moments are not posited in them subjectively. In so far as they realise themselves, it is by acting on other bodies.
Progress and Development
[8] As Hegel is seeking a self-realising process, he begins: “The concrete totality which is the beginning contains as such the beginning of progress and development (Fortgehens und Entwicklung).” (472) Such a concrete totality is “internally differentiated”, but because of immediacy, its determinations are various. Yet it is also a unity. This is the first advance – the emergence of “difference, judgement, determination in general”. (472) Universality must he found. Hegel here draws a contrast:
“The procedure of common sense (verständige) finite cognition is that it takes up again equally externally from the concrete that which it had left out in the abstractive creation of this universal. The absolute method on the other hand does not behave like external reflection, but draws the determinate directly from the object itself, since it is the object’s immanent principle or soul.” (472)
The Dialectic in Plato and Kant
Hegel uses Plato to illustrate absolute method. Plato insisted on contemplating things alone, partly in their universality, partly by “bringing before consciousness what is immanent in them” (472). We should avoid “catching at externals, examples and comparisons” at the expense of these. In so far as it is analytic, it simply develops the content of the universal, but the method is also synthetic. This means that the object shows itself to be an Other by virtue of its character as an immediate and simple universal and the accompanying determinacy. This variety is different from the synthesis of finite cognition.
[9] Hegel describes Plato’s method further. He writes: “This equally synthetic and analytic movement of judgement, by which the empirical universal determines itself out of itself to be its own Other, may rightly be called the dialectic moment.” (473) Hegel refers explicitly to the Greeks when he writes:
“Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences which have been most misjudged in modern metaphysics and in the popular philosophy of ancients and moderns alike. Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that, while Thales was the founder of natural philosophy and Socrates of moral philosophy, he was the founder of the third science which belongs to philosophy, namely dialectic.” (473)
So it was held to be his highest merit, though many who spoke of Plato neglected it. It is considered an art, a subjective talent. [E.g. Aristotle relegated dialectic mostly to his Rhetoric, noting its misuse and sophistical character. - SC] Kant has reinstated it as necessary to reason. Hegel though, wishes to correct his conclusion about it.
[10] Dialectic appears contingent, but “usually has this form, that opposite determinations are demonstrated n the same object” (473). So for example:
- The world – is both finite and infinite in space and time
- Motion – is both present and absent at a given point
- The Point – is both negation of and relation to spatiality.
The older Eleatics directed themselves against motion; Plato against contemporary ideas (especially those of the Sophists), but also against pure categories; the later Skeptics against the data of consciousness, maxims of ordinary life and all concepts of science. Hegel says: “The conclusion which is drawn from such a dialectic is contradiction in general and the nullity of the assertions made.” (474) This conclusion can be drawn in a twofold manner: either objectively or subjectively. Objectively, it is concluded that the “contradictory” object does not exist. Subjectively, it is concluded that our cognition is deficient: dialectic is perhaps an illusion, or folly, or wickedness. The Eleatics were in the Objective class. Among the subjective responses, is that of “so-called sound common sense” (des gesunden Menschenverstandes), which “holds fast to the evidence of the senses and to customary ideas and expressions”. (474) Then there was Diogenes the Cynic, who refuted the Eleatics by silently walking, and the opponents of Socrates, who thought him wicked. Of this, Hegel writes: “insofar as the dialectic transcends moral determinations, reason must be trusted to reconstitute them, but in their truth and in the knowledge of their limitations no less than of their rights.” (474) Kant and the skeptics both regard cognition in general as defective.
[11] Hegel comments: “The fundamental prejudice here is that the dialectic has only a negative result.” (474). This view comes about when the object, or our cognition of it, is declared null (nichtig), but the predicates ascribed to it are retained as valid (gültig) in themselves. Hegel writes: “It is an infinite merit of Kant’s philosophy that it draws attention to this uncritical procedure.” (475) Kant thus facilitates the reconstruction of logic and dialectic through consideration of the thought-determinations in themselves. Without thought, an object is but an image or a name. Hegel says:
“The object in its existence without thought and concept is an image (Vorstellung) or a name: it is what it is in the determinations of thought and concept. They are the true object and content of reason, and whatever is elsewhere meant by object and content in opposition to these is valid in them and through them alone.” (475)
Hence we should not blame objects or cognition when they prove their dialectical nature through external connections. We suppose that they are correct in themselves and that a dialectical or contradictory relation arises only by a contingent connexion operating through a third term. These subjects of imagination though, are not ultimate terms – they must be taken as concepts. Hegel concludes: “Thus all opposites which are taken as fixed, like for example finite and infinite, or individual and universal, are contradictory not in virtue of some external connexion (Verknüpfung), but rather are transitions in and for themselves.” (475) They are presuppositions and beginnings, but: “reason scrutinises their very selves, is their moving soul, and stimulates their dialectic. (475)
The Second Term
[12] The first term was our beginning. This then is the standpoint from which: “what first was immediate is thus mediated and related to an other, or that the universal is as a particular.” (476) This second term – the other – is a negation of the first. This Other though, is not an empty negative, or nothing. It is the other of the first, “the negative of the immediate”. (476) Thus it is essentially mediated and contains the first. Hegel writes: “The first is thus essentially contained and preserved in the Other – To hold fast the positive in the negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition.” (476) All of Logic consists of examples of proofs of this. [This resembles the Form of Self-consciousness of Edward Caird and the Form of the Personal of John Macmurray. An instance would be when a considered opinion replaces a hasty judgement, i.e. immediate presumption gives rise to its opposite in doubt, which is then replaced by practical conviction when we return to judgement in the practical sphere.]
[13] Thus we have our mediated second term (das Zweite). Hegel explains the relationship: “the first is contained in the second and the second is the truth of the first.” (476). The relationship can be put in the form of a proposition, e.g.
- The finite is infinite
- One is many
- The individual is universal.
But these in form are inadequate to the content. This was shown in our discussion of positive judgement as not competent to speculation and truth. It would at least require to be complemented by negative judgement. In “S is P”, the subject seems to have persistence (Bestehen), while in fact it is “taken away in the predicate as its other.” (476) Hence, negation is also required, but the content eludes the form of positing, which is the nature of judgement.
[14] This Second, negative term is mediated (by the first), but also mediating. It involves relation: “it is negative – the negative, however, of the positive, and includes the latter.” (477) These are not two indifferent terms. The second is Other to the first. Hence it is contradiction – distinction or relation. The second term can be characterised as: negative, determinate, relative and embedded in judgement. This contrasts with formal thought, which makes identity its law. Hence the contradictory content is thrown into sensuous representation, and the contradictory terms are juxtaposed in space and time rather than brought into contact. Hegel says:
“In this connexion, this thought makes it its fixed principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but in truth the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept. In point of fact, formal thought does think contradiction, but immediately disregards it, and with it the empty assertion of that principle passes over to abstract negation.” (477)
If this does not appear dialectical, it is only because thoughts are being held apart.
The Third Term
[15] This negation is the turning point (der Wendungspunckt) of the movement of reason. It is “the innermost source of all activity, of living and mental self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth.” (477) Hegel writes:
“The second negative, the negative of the negative which we have reached, is this transcendence of the contradiction, but is not more the activity of an external reflection than the contradiction is: it is the innermost and most inward moment of life and spirit, by virtue of which a subject is personal and free.” (477-78)
We have then the second premiss of a syllogism, or inference. There is:
- First premiss – immediate, analytic, immediate relation to the other. This is the moment of universality and communication (Mitteilung).
- Second premiss – synthetic, relation of distinct to distinct, mediate. This is individual, an exclusive relation to an Other. It is a mediator, including both itself and the immediate that it negates.
If these are seen as external, the negative is the formal mediating element. However, “as absolute negativity, the negative moment of absolute mediation is the unity which is subjectivity and soul.” (478)
[16] Hegel says: “At this turning point of the method, the course of cognition also turns back upon itself.” (478). He continues: “This negativity, as self-abolishing contradiction, is the reconstitution of the first immediacy.” (478) If this were a mere formal process, we would just be back where we started. The result in practice though is the third term. Before examining this, we turn to the question of formalism.
Note on Formalism
If we go by numbers, we have then:
- The first immediate
- Its negation (mediated being)
- The reconstituted immediate.
This is a triplicity. However, we might also count after step two:
- The second negation (“Absolute negativity”)
- The reconstituted immediate.
This however, with its extra duality, is quadruplicity. The final term though, is “the unity of the immediate and the mediated”. (478) Such a formulation is simplistic. Kant’s merit was to demonstrate it in the twelve categories and illustrate it. Hegel writes: “The syllogism, and the threefold generally, has always been recognised as the general form of reason”. (479) But this form was seen as external and apart from the content. The formal syllogism ends in identity and thus lacks the dialectical moment (i.e. negativity). But in the above, the relation of the terms includes the negative element. Formalists have seized on triplicity. Their “philosophical construction” attaches it as a framework to all sorts of matter and thus “this form has been rendered tedious and of ill-repute” (479) because it is merely an external arrangement for them. Yet, “its inner value cannot be diminished by this vapid misuse, and it must still be deemed a great matter that the outward form of rational procedure has been discovered, albeit not understood.” (479) [End of note]
One way of looking at the third term under discussion here, is as an upshot of the elementary mental act of comparison. In comparison, the mind holds two objects in consciousness and perceives their relationship. This relation then, is a third term.
[17] Hegel recapitulates the emergence of the third term. He writes: “the third term is the immediate through transcendence (Aufhebung) of mediation, the simple through transcendence of distinction (des Unterschiedes), and the positive through transcendence of the negative.” (479) Thus reason realises itself through otherness. It has thus established its absolute reality (seine absolute Realität), or simple self-relation. This result is truth. The third term is not quiescent (ein ruhiges Dritte), but movement and activity even in its unity.
We began with the universal, but our result is the individual, the concrete and the subject. The universal is posited in the subject. The first two moments are abstract and false: this makes them dialectical. They make themselves subject. The concept is the universal that runs through all moments of the syllogism. The third term is the conclusion.
[18] We have recovered immediacy then. As a self-identical whole, the entity has retained its nature. We have returned to what can be a new beginning. To apprehend the result might seem to be to analyse it, to separate its determinations and see the movement through which it arose. This however, is the earlier stage of Analytic cognition. We must also be synthetic and take into account the Other. The result is now object, a new foundation, but the method remains the same. The foundation still has immediacy as form, but it is result. We no longer assume the content, but have deduced and demonstrated it.
In our concluding post, we discuss the expansion of the method into system.
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