Fiorinda Li Vigni. Jacques D’Hondt and the Journey of Hegelian Reason. Paris: Harmattan, 2005.
Hegel and the French
Evaluation of D'Hondt
D'Hondt in his own Words
“A prudent abstention is certainly the right phrase. Taking account of my personal education, the conditions it was carried out in, the situations it led me into and the consequences of this destiny, I almost always had the impression of not being the best placed to propose and expound any conclusions whatever on social and political phenomena and also on the development of philosophical ideas. For a long time I was a provincial, reduced to a modest and precarious university post and I was very impressed by the sometimes serious, but always brilliant, character of the ideological representatives of my time. And so I always had the feeling that I needn’t bother with it, that it wasn’t my field and that I had simply – and this is what I did – to form my opinions for myself, and then, also, carry out my job as a teacher: to comment on the opinions of others, make them more accessible to a wider public and notably to a public of students who need to be taught.
Consequently, I consciously and voluntarily practised this abstention through modesty, through lack of character perhaps, through human respect, through consciousness of the fact that others were more able than me to carry out this task and that they were in any case better placed to carry it out effectively. There also I was deceived, because the great intellectuals in whom I placed my trust and whom I thought would succeed in resolving the problems that concerned me, they didn’t resolve them either. I very much hesitated to say it, and I only very partially said it, very moderately and almost confidentially. There was in the contemporary philosophers that I knew a sparkling, brilliant attitude – a Sartre, an Althusser - these were astonishing intelligences, wells of learning. They had read everything; they had notoriety, authority; people listened to them. I expected from them that they would answer my questions, not that I would have an answer to the questions of others. If they had replied well to my questions, I would have commented on their replies, so that everyone would agree to them. That didn’t happen. They developed, by and by, doctrines that I found lacking in relation to what I had expected, and at the same time, I had nothing else to propose. So I contented myself by commenting on the great authors, notably the two great authors to whom I devoted myself – Hegel and Marx – and this didn’t fall badly for me. They were truly inexhaustible authors and you can enrich yourself and others in studying them.
In these conditions, theoretical changes are relatively modest. The word “rupture” (break) is not so suitable. There were ruptures at the outset: I broke very young in some way intellectually with my social and cultural surroundings, and then latterly I could break with the narrow character of my first studies. But these are less breaks than extensions. Being who I was, I expanded my activities, I expanded at the end my editorial activity, but these are not really breaks, except then, of course, the final break due to the collapse of “real socialism” [i.e. the Soviet collapse, 1989] and what I had expected from it. There was thus a sort of fortunate enlargement of my way of thinking, of my scholarship, of my activities over a long period, and then at the end a brusque shrinking of all that. There is the state of perplexity. This word is the one I use most of the time to characterise the state I’m in. Not a total perplexity, I still make judgements, here and there, on little things. But I have become even more prudent in what concerns the large problematics.”
So all in all, D’Hondt comes across as a modest man whose Hegel scholarship deserves to be better known, certainly by anyone concerned with Hegel’s politics or his reception in France. Much of his work though – e.g. on Bergson and Foucault - is of local or passing interest. I would take seriously his and Li Vigni’s view that his Hegel Biographie (1998, above) is the best source of his mature views on Hegel, which are thoroughly grounded in a lifetime’s scholarship and independent of those of Terry Pinkard and Horst Althaus. I also draw the conclusion that we should read Hegel himself, as much secondary literature is written from dogmatic or refuted viewpoints.