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| The first English translation of Hegel's Science of Logic (1929). |
Introduction (Stephen Cowley)
The third volume of Hegel's Science of Logic (1816), titled “Subjective Logic”, begins with a significant essay that orients the reader through the remainder of the book, entitled “On the Notion in General”. As Hegel considered the logico-metaphysical ideas it contains decisive for his philosophy, I intend to share a summary of it, adding some thoughts of my own. I will divide it between two posts.
The opening “Advertisement” of the volume relates the text to the concerns of a contemporary religious revival. Hegel writes: “If the enquiry of religion about the value of things, sentiments and acts – an enquiry which has substantially the same meaning [as that of philosophers and logicians] – lays claim to its rights more and more in our days, then philosophy too [...] now once more endeavours to rise to its goal.” (210) – i.e. the goal of truth. This religious enquiry may include Schleiermacher, to judge by Hegel’s previous writings and the reference to “sentiment”, or perhaps the rejection of the religion of reason preached by the early French revolutionaries. Perhaps it is made in reference to the opening years of the Restoration. The passage introduces the idea of truth (Hegel references Pilate’s question to Christ) that rings through the essay we are about to discuss, a richer idea than that of correspondence that has something of the sense of “I plight my troth”.
The essay begins with a summary of the conclusion of the previous Books of the Science of Logic. The previous two volumes of Objective logic covered metaphysical and mathematical ideas best adapted to understanding nature. There is a distinctive tendency to talk difference up into opposition and opposition up into contradiction, as well as Hegel’s stress on the unity of mind which he indicates by the interrelatedness of concepts. They also vindicate the concepts of essence and real natures as objects of understanding. In my view the Objective logic is vitiated by its initial failure to distinguish uncreated from created being (God as necessary ground of being from the contingent and dependent being of the world and finite minds, i.e. the assumption of the “univocity of being”). As the train of concepts are developed, this leads to a recurrent equivocation in the text between analysis of ideas about creation and consideration of a priori ideas “before creation”. I found my close reading of these initial volumes frustrating. I will discuss the relation of the Objective logic to the Phenomenology od Spirit elsewhere.
We will soon see that Hegel’s main conversation partners in this essay are Spinoza and Kant. He has already considered Spinoza as a theorist of Substance in the Doctrine of Essence. Hegel introduces the idea of “self-consciousness” as a key to the nature of the concept, but it is not clear that he has the self-consciousness of the Phenomenology in mind as he does so.
I use notion/concept/reason indifferently as translations of Begriff here. The term “Reason” captures what is meant in a rough way, as the Concept involved has the aspects of overarching unity and mediation that are included in Reason: different people have their reasons, but ultimately there is only one Reason. Hegel himself makes the identification. The term "Concept" implies Hegel’s theory of reality as containing a generic (universal) level, subsequently elaborated into particular forms that result in an individual embodiment of the universal. Where this is not in play, reason seems a more colloquial and intelligible term in English. Hegel invokes Aristotle’s view of the objective nature of thought (“All men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and principles of things.” Metaphysics A, 981) and the Logos tradition in general when he writes: “It is logos which should least of all be left outside logical science.” (Johnson & Struthers, Vol 1, 48).
Page references in what follows are to the Johnson & Struthers translation (London: Allen, 1929) and the Glockner German edition. Johnson and Struthers were students of the British Idealist J.M. McTaggart. The passage under discussion is on pages 508-26 of Di Giovanni’s translation (Cambridge: UP, 2010) and Gesammelte Werke, Vol 12, 5-30. The Arnold Miller translation (1969) is widely considered surpassed by Di Giovanni.
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| John McTaggart (1866-1925). |
The Notion in General
Hegel states at the outset that the nature of the concept/reason cannot be indicated immediately. It might seem, Hegel continues, that we must make a presupposition of the logical element to give the concept of an object, much as in geometry there are axioms. However, reason must be seen, not only as a subjective presupposition, but as an absolute foundation. It can only be an absolute foundation when it has made itself into one though. What is first is abstract, and thus mediated. Hence we must seek the foundation (die Grundlage). This must then be immediate, but by way of having become immediate. Hence, Hegel concludes, reason is a third term. “Being and Essence are thus far the moments of its becoming, but it is their foundation and truth.” (Glockner, 5) It is an identity in which they are submerged and contained. They are contained in it because it is their result. [i.e. the result of thinking objectively about them. – SC]
Hence, in more detail, “Substance already is real essence, or Essence insofar as it is united with Being and has entered into reality.” (211) Consequently, the concept has substance for immediate presupposition. The concept comes about from the dialectic movement of causality and reciprocity. Substance’s mode of relationship is necessity, and thus freedom (as the truth of necessity) is the mode of reason. Hegel then summarises the precursor arguments (from Logic II Essence):
“Substance is the Absolute, the real which is in and for itself, - in-itself, as simple identity of possibility and reality, absolute essence, containing all reality and possibility within itself; for-itself, this identity is absolute power, or thoroughgoing self-relating negativity. – The movement of substantiality, which is set forth through these moments, has the following structure:” (212)
* Substance as absolute power
* Active substance as cause, with its effects
* Freedom, as the truth of necessity.
There is active as well as passive substance. As cause, it manifests its effects as Gesetztseyn (posited being, i.e. something there for a reason). In the resulting appearance, cause displays its nature in its effect, with which it is identical. This is the revelation of a Subject. The completion of substance, its culmination, is something higher; the Concept, the Subject. [Hegel then turns to explain the above formulaic statements by reference to Spinoza’s philosophy. – SC]
Spinoza and the history of philosophy
Hegel reminds us that he has already mentioned (Essence, 167) that Spinoza’s philosophy takes up the standpoint of substance and shows its deficiency. However, elsewhere [Phenomenology, Preface] he has said: “The refutation of a philosophic system [...] must be purged of the erroneous idea that the system is to be presented as false throughout, and that the true system is just opposed to the false.” (214) [This introduces the idea of the logical ideas as embodied in the history of philosophy. The emphasis on Spinoza at the expense of medieval Aristotelian thought is questionable on the question of substance and might be seen as an instance of Hegel’s eliding the distinction of creator and creation. – SC]
Hegel explains that the idea of substance arose from that of Essence. This presentation was extended into a system. Hence this was a necessary standpoint, i.e. not merely a subjective opinion. He writes:
“Such a standpoint must not then be regarded as an opinion, a subjective and arbitrary manner of imagining or thinking peculiar to an individual, nor as an aberration of speculation; rather, speculation in its course necessarily is promoted to this point, and in so far the system is perfectly true. – But it is not the highest standpoint.” (G10, 214)
Hence the truth must not oppose, but contain, what went before. The refutation must not, furthermore, come from outside. Hegel comments: “It has been said that no refutation of Spinoza’s system can be made for those who do not presuppose for themselves as decided the freedom and independence of the self-conscious subject.” (215) However, he adds, the system already includes thought as an attribute. An external refutation would: “uphold the opposite forms of the given assumptions, - for example, the absolute persistence of the thinking individual as against the form of Thought as the latter is posited in absolute Substance.” (215) On the other hand, he continues:
“True refutation must engage the force of the opponent and must place itself within the compass of his strength. The cause is not advanced if he is attacked outside himself and the case is carried in his absence. Hence the refutation of Spinoza’s system can consist solely in this: that his standpoint be first recognised as essential and as necessary, but that secondly this standpoint be raised out of itself to a higher.” (G11, 215)
[This illustrates Hegel’s essentialist use of “necessary” as the opposite of “accidental” rather than “contingent”. It raises the question of the history of ideas in general: the attention given to Spinoza is attributed to the requirements of universal history. The international interest awakened by Spinoza’s Biblical criticism and the novel content of his posthumous Ethics lend this some plausible justification. Alongside this though, there is an element of wilfulness in choosing what texts to attend to. At this point, the pure history of ideas intersects with more concrete material and communal interests which are also served by historical narratives. – SC]
The Emergence of the Concept – From Substance to Subject
The relation of Substantiality leads to its opposite, i.e. the Concept. Hegel refers to the argument of the Doctrine of Essence. His exposition of substance there, he says, is:“the only and veritable refutation of Spinoza’s system. It is the unveiling (Enthüllung) of substance, and thus is the genesis (Genesis) of the Concept, the principal moments of which were summarised above.” (G11, 215)
These moments are:
* The unity of substance is the relationship of necessity
* But this is only inner necessity
* While it posits itself through the moment of absolute negativity, it becomes manifested or posited identity, and thereby freedom, which is the identity of the Concept.
* The Concept is the totality which results from reciprocity
* This is because the elements of relation are no longer blind, but visible in and through each other in their Gesetztseyn. In this, they belong to freedom.
[Theologically, this reminds me of the Word of God. Spinoza’s attribute of thought implies an element of freedom akin to the divine Word of Genesis 1 evoked in John 1.1. However, it is intended primarily as a rational argument. – SC] Hegel explains that the original fact (die ursprüngliche Sache) is cause of itself (die Ursache ihrer selbst), i.e. substance set free for the Concept. [This is a development from Spinoza’s definition of substance as causa sui. The main line of argument is that Spinoza does not sufficiently draw out all that is included in the idea of thought as an attribute of Substance, in particular negative judgement and the freedom of choice it underlies. – SC] Hegel proceeds:
“In the Concept, accordingly, the realm of freedom has opened. [...] The darkness in which each of the substances which are in the relation of causality stands to the other, has vanished, for the originality of their individual standing has passed over into a Gesetztseyn (positedness). [...] Substance [...] having achieved freedom, has become Concept.” (216)
Anundfürsichseyn has become Gesetztseyn (i.e. from substance has emerged a realm of decision). So the concept as self-related is absolutely determinate, but as accompanying itself in self-relation, it is the negation of determinacy, i.e. it is Universal. It is also singular (Einzelnes), for it arises in a specific way as negation of determinacy. Both aspects are the totality. There is an element of reflection in the twofold character of each. This is the “Concept of the Concept”.
Relations to Common Sense and Recent Skepticism
Hegel notes that this idea seems to differ from commonly conceived ideas of concept. However, he argues, confirmation from ordinary understanding (des gewöhnlichen Verstehens) is not relevant, as its authority carries no weight here. [This refers back to his and others (including Spinoza’s) view of the negative and revising relation of philosophy (and religion) to ordinary understanding. – SC] Hegel relies instead on the immanent deduction derived from its genesis. But should it not, he asks, still be recognisable in our common ideas? On this point, Hegel comments:
“It is not so easy to discover what others have said about the nature of the Concept. For generally, they do not concern themselves at all with this quest, and presuppose that everyone understands automatically when the Concept is discussed.” (217)
More recently, the Concept has been dismissed out of hand. Imagination and memory too are slighted and in philosophy calumny is heaped on the summit of thought. Instead, the Concept is ridiculed and renounced both as objective and as method. [There is no further hint as to what literature this refers to. It sounds like contemporary Skepticism and perhaps what is now known as neo-Kantianism are the target. – SC] Hegel now turns to discuss self-consciousness in reference to Kant's critical philosophy.
See Part Two.
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