Sunday 7 March 2021

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in Scots - 1

 

This is an experiment in translating sections of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) into broad Scots. We start with the sub-section on the Law of the Heart from Chapter 5 - Reason. Vocabulary and reading suggestions - particularly for the Stage, spatial movement and mental dispositions - welcome. The video includes photographs from my trip in 2017 to the parts of Switzerland (Tschugg, Erlach and Berne) where Hegel lived as a tutor from 1793-96. The script follows:

Chapter Five - Reason

The Law o the Hert an Delusions o Grandeur


TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

[In the first pairt o this middle section o chapter five, self-consciousness breenges, like Faust, frae its scholarly preoccupations, intae the life o the warld wi ill-thocht-out desires an nae plan o life, but comes tae grief on the necessities it encounters there. Here it comes on the scene for a saicont time, but this time wi a plan: the “law o the hert”. – SC]

1. Situation at the outset

367.  Whit necessitie in truth is tae self-consciousness, it is for its new form, whaurin self-consciousness is tae itsel as necessitie. Self-consciousness kens the universal – whit is common – immediately, or it kens that it hes the law wi-in itsel. Tae indicate its nature as internal tae consciousness, it is cawit the Law o the Hert. This form – the saicont, fallaein “wish an necessitie” – is for itsel as singular beand (Wesen), as afore, but it is richer in its vocation, in that this counts for it as necessary or common.

368.  Owre agin this hert stauns reality, for the law at first is ainly for itsel in the hert, no yet realisit an so tae somehin ither nor the concept, or reason is. This Ither is thereby characterisit as a reality that is opposit tae whit is to be realisit, that is, the contradiction o the law an individuality.

2. The universal

369.  The reality is on the ae haun a law by whilk the singular individuality is hauden doun, a violent order o the warld that contradicts the law o the hert; an on the tither haun a humanity sufferin unner it that disnae fallae the law o the hert, but is subject tae an alien necessity.
This reality that kythes (appears) facin the current form o consciousness is, seen in a clear licht, naethin ither nor the previous dividit (entzweyte) relationship o the individual an his (or her) truth, the relationship tae an atrocious necessity by whilk it is smotherit.
For us (as observers) then, the previous moment stauns in contrast tae the new form, because haein emergit frae it, the moment it cam frae is necessary for it. Tae it, houiver, it kythes as somehin at haun, while it hes nae consciousness about its origin, an tae it the essential is mair tae be the negative agin this positive in-itsel.

3. The singular individual

370.  This individuality is directit at tae’in awa the necessity at contradicts the law of the hert an the sufferin it causes. In this, it it nae langer the carelessness o the precedin form, that ainly saucht efter its ain whigmaleeries (die einzelne Lust), but it hes the seriousness o a loftier purpose that seeks its satisfaction in vauntin its ain excellence an in bringin about the weilfare o humanity.
Whit it realises is itsel the law an hence its desire is at the same time common tae aw herts. Baith gang thegither (sind ungetrennt) for it: - its desire, the lawfu – an the realisation o the law o common humanity, warkin out its ain desire. For ben itsel, individuality an necessity are immediately ane. - The law is the law o the hert. Individuality is no yet dislodgit frae its place an the unity o baith hasnae yet come intae place throu the mediatin movement  o the moments, throu discipline.
The realisation o the rudderless creature (ungezogenen Wesens) counts as the presentation o excellence an the realisation o the weilfare o humanity. 

The dialectic sterts

4. The individual agin the universal

371.  The oppos’t law at contrasts wi the law o the hert is dividit (getrennt) frae the hert an freely for itsel. Mankind wha answers tae this law disnae live in the fortunate unity o the law wi the hert, but either in dreidfu separation (Trennung) an sufferin, or at least in want o enjoyin itsel in obeyin the law, an wi’out consciousness o its ain excellence in owresteppin it.
Because that official divine an human order is dividit frae the hert, it is tae this hert a semblance at suld tyne the pouer an reality at is still jyned tae it.
It may by chance agree as tae its content wi the law o the hert, an thain the hert can lee it alane, but it isnae the pure lawfuness as such at is at stake for it, but that [the hert] hes consciousness o itsel in it, that it hae satisfied itsel in the maitter. When though, the content o common necessity disnae agree wi the hert, than the necessity accordin tae its content is naethin in itsel an hes tae gie wey tae the law o the hert.   

5. The dialectic o the universal

372.  So the individual brings about the law o his hert. It becomes the law o the land – an the desire [becomes] a reality at is lawfu throu-an-throu. In this makin-it- real tho, it hes fled frae him. It is nou the universal pouer, for whilk this hert is indeifferent, sae that the individual nae langer finds his ain order as he proposit it in the law o the land. Hence, throu the realisation o his law, he disnae mak his law but, while it’s really his aw alang but he thinks it’s foreign, whit he really brings about is his ain involvement in the real order – an this no ainly as foreign, but [as] a superior enemy pouer.
Throu his deeds, he places himsel in, or raither as, the universal element o existan reality. His very deed, accordin tae whit it means, is supposit tae hae the worth o a universal order, but thereby he has won free frae his ain pair sel. He waxes as universality an wanes as particularity, frae whilk he purifies his’sel. 
He wha ainly wants tae ken universality in the form o its immediate front desk, disnae recognise his’sel in this free universality, while he in fact belangs tae it, for it is his ain daein. 
Hence, this deed hes the waunert meanin (die verkerte Bedeutung) o contradictin the universal order, for his ain deed needs must be the deed o his ain particular hert, no free universal reality; and at the same time he hes recognisit reality in his deed, for daein the action means assertin its nature as free reality, the whilk means recognisin reality as its essence.

373.  The individual, throu the very concept o his deed, has delineatit mair nearly the wey in whilk the real universality tae whilk he made his’sel belang, turns back agin him. His deed as reality belangs tae the universal, but the content is his ain individuality. He wants tae maintain his’sel as this singularity staunin aside frae the universal.
It isnae ony definite law whase establishment is at stake, but the immediate unity o the particular hert wi the commonweill is the thocht erectit intae law an supposit tae count as such. The universal is that in whase laws ilka hert hes tae see itsel reflectit back.
But ainly the hert o this individual hes its reality in his deed, whilk tae him hauds aloft his ain self-image, or embodies his ain whimsy. It shuld count immediately as universal, whilk means, it is in truth something particular and hes ainly the form o universality. 
Its particular content is supposit tae count straight aff the bat as universal. Hence, ithers dinnae find in this content the law o their herts, but raither that brocht about by anither chiel. They juist as meikle turn thirsels agin the reality whilk his hert laid doun. Thus, the individual finds, as at first ainly the staney law, nou the herts o men staun agin his ain best intentions, an so are tae be loathit. 

374.  Because this consciousness at the aff kens universality ainly as immediate an the necessity as a necessity frae the hert, the nature o whit has awready been brocht tae pass is unkent tae it – [it disnae ken that,] as existin, it is in truth the universal awready, whaurin the particularity o consciousness whilk entrusts itsel tae whit hes been done in order tae get on wi its ain life, insteid founders. Insteid o attainin this its beand, it attains the alienation o itsel.
That whit this chiel disnae ken houiver, is nae langer a deid necessity, but necessity animatit (belebt) by universal individuality. He tuke this divine an human order, whit he fund in operation (geltend) for a deid reality, in whilk, no ainly his ain sel – tae whit he clings as ae hert agin the warld – but the ithers tae whae belang tae the order didnae ken thirsels either. But he finds the order insteid animatit by the consciousness o aw, an as the law o aw herts. 
He finds out that at reality is an animatit order, een by the fact at it realises the law o his hert, for this means naethin ither nor that individuality becomes objective as common tae aw, whaurin he, nanetheless, disnae see his’sel. 

6. The dialectic o the particular

375.  Whit emerges frae the experience o this shape o consciousness as the truth, contradicts whit it is for itsel. Whit it is for itsel though, hes itsel the form o absolute universality as shape. It is the law o the hert that is immediately ane wi self-consciousness. At the same time, the settlit an livin order is also its ain essence an product. It produces naethin ither nor order. It is alsweill in immediate unity wi self-consciousness. In this wey, this self-consciousness belangs tae a twafauld an self-opposit essentiality, sel-contradictory an inwardly broken-doun.
The law o this hert is ainly that in whilk self-consciousness recognises itsel., but the universally valid order hes become, though the realisation  o that law, his ain essence an his ain reality tae him. Whit contradicts itsel in his consciousness is for him baith in the form o the essence an o his ain reality.

376.  While he speiks about this moment o his self-consciousness an therein the outcome o his experience, he shaws his’sel as this inversion o himself, as the madness o consciousness for whilk its essence is immediately inessential, its reality immediately unreal.
The madness thus cannae be kept up, that on principle something essential be taen for inessential, something unreal for real, sae that whit for ane is essential or real, warnae sae for anither, an the consciousness of reality an unreality, or o the essential an inessential shuld faw apairt.
Gin something is in the common wey real an essential for consciousness, but isnae so for me, I thus hae in my consciousness o its naethinness, because I am at the same time the common consciousness, alsweill consciousness o its reality, - an while these are baith nailit doun an in place, this is a unity whilk is folly overall. In this though, ainly an object for consciousness hes gane mad, no consciousness as sic.
In the outcome o the experience at hes its result here, consciousness is houiver aware o itsel in its law as this reality, an at the same time, while the very same essence, the same reality is estrangit frae it, it is, as absolute self-consciousness, as reality A per se, aware o its ain unreality. Or, baith sides count tae him, accordan tae their contradiction immediately as his essence, that thus in its very nature is mad.

377.  The impassionit hertbeat for the weillfare o humankind thus passes owre intae the ravin o a crazy self-aggrandisement. It turns intae the fury (die Wuth) o consciousness tae preserve itsel agin its ain destruction by means o castin the incoherence (Verkehrtheit) that it itsel is, out ayont itsel. It strains itsel tae look on an express that incoherence as that o an Ither.
This consciousness speaks o the universal order as an invention o fanatical priests, carousan despots an their lackeys whae compensate thirsels for their humiliation  by humiliation and repression o thaim below them. It expresses the manipulatit incoherence o the law o the hert and its ill-staurit fortune [that warks] to the nameless poverty o betrayit humanity.   
Consciousness expresses, in its craziness here, individuality as whit renders it deleerit an incoherent, but a fremmit an antrin [contingent] individuality. But the hert, or the immediate, singular consciousness willin universal bein, is itsel derangin an incoherent. Its activity is ainly the production o whit this contradiction becomes tae its consciousness. For the truth tae him is the law o the hert – a merely intendit that hasnae, like the establishit order, bydit the heat o the day, but has rather, as it turns out here, founderit.
This is law suld be implementit. Herein the law as reality, as valid order, is the goal an essence [Wesen] tae him. Yet jist as much is reality, i.e. the law as the valid order, immediately rather nugatory tae him. Jist as his ain reality, he himsel as singular consciousness is essence tae his’sel, but it is his goal tae impose it as existan. Raither tae him is his sel as non-singular immediately the essence, or purpose as law een as a universal, whilk it suld be for his consciousness. This his concept becomes somehin objective throu his activity. He on the contrary pruives it as unreal, an the unreality as his reality. So it is no a chance an alien individuality that is derangit and derangin, but this very hert frae aw sides an intrinsically so.

7. The warslin o the twa

378.  Whilst though, the immediate universal individuality is derangit an derangin, nanetheless this universal order, because it is the law o aw herts, whilk is to say derangement, is itsel intrinsically derangit, as the ravin madness said.
Aince the order pruives itsel the law o aw herts, by the opposition whilk the law o ae hert finds in the ithers, the establishit laws are defendit agin the law o an individual, because they are nae unconscious, toom an deid necessity, but a common mental property (geistige Allgemeinheit) and substance, in whilk thaim for whae it is real live as individuals an place their confidence. 
Gin they also complain about this order, as though to reaffirm the inner law an retain the conceit o the hert agin that order, in fact they thus depend on it, alang wi their hert, as their very bein (Wesen). An gin this order be taen frae them, or they place thirsels furth o it, they tyne awthin. Whilst the very reality an pouer o the public order consists in this, this public order kythes as the uniform, animatit bein (Wesen), an individuality as its form – but een sae, this order is tapsalteerie (das Verkehrte).

379.  For public order is a reality in this, that it is the law o aw herts, at aw individuals immediately are this universality. This reality is reality ainly o individuality beand for itsel, or yon o the hert. 
The consciousness, at sets up the law o the hert, pruives opposition frae ithers, because it contradicts the equally singular laws o their herts, an these in their opposition dae nae ither nor set up and pit intae force their law. 
Hence the universal that is at haun is ainly a universal opposition an strauchle o aw agin aw, whaurin ilkane maks his ain individuality count, but at the same time disnae thrive (nicht dazu kommt) because he experiences the like opposition and is stymied (aufgelöst) by the ithers, as they by him.
Whit luiks like public order is this universal tyauvin (Befehdung), whaurin ilk brings tae fruition whit he can, maks use o justice agin the singularity o ithers and establishes his ain, that equally disappears throu [the efforts o] the ithers.
This public order is the gait o the warld (der Weltlauf), the illusion o an enduring airt (Gang), that o a universality merely ettlit eftir, an the content o whilk is raither the essentiality o the stipulation (Festsetzung) o singularities an their dissolution.

8. Conclusion

380.  Lat us conseider baith sides o the universal order ane agin tither. The last universality hes for its content the restless universality, for whilk whimsy, or singularity, is law, the real is unreal and the unreal real. At the same time though, it is the side o the reality o order, for the being-for-sel o individuality belangs tae it. 
The tither side is the universal as placid beand (ruhiges Wesen), an this ainly as an inner, that is no ava naethin, but yet is nae reality, and whilk can ainly become real throu the settin aside (Aufhebung) o individuality, whilk hes laid claim tae reality for itsel.
This [new] form o consciousness is vertue (die Tugend) – tae become itsel in the law, in the true an guid in thaimsels, no ainly as essence (Wesen), but tae ken individuality as the derangit and derangin an hence tae hae tae sacrifice the ain-gaitit-ness o consciousness.

2 comments:

  1. Facinating! And since I am a great fan of Robbie Burns and the whole Scottish enlightenment project, this is especially close to my heart and as an illustrator Im thinking of doing a kind of philosophical graphic novel on what is surely the most international poet in the world. Will be folding your project eagerly.

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    Replies
    1. Thanks. The Epistle to James Tennant helps tie in Burns with philosophy: "Smith, wi' his moral feeling, and Reid to Common Sense appealing..."

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